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Abstract
We present new evidence about the long-run relationship between state capacity
and economic performance in Europe, the birthplace of modern economic growth. Our
database is novel and spans 11 countries and 4 centuries from the Old Regime to World
War I. We argue that national governments undertook two political transformations over
this period: fiscal centralization and limited government. We find a significant direct
relationship between fiscal centralization and economic growth. Furthermore, we find
that an increase in the state’s capacity to extract greater tax revenues was one mechanism
through which both fiscal centralization and, to some extent, limited government played
significant economic roles. We believe that our analysis is among the first to show sys-
tematic evidence that state capacity is an important determinant of long-run economic
growth.
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1 Introduction
Standard economic theory assumes that states are effective. Namely, states have enough
administrative infrastructure to provide secure property rights, basic market regulations,
and dispute resolution through courts. Yet effective states are only a recent historical de-
velopment and represent just a fraction of modern nations.1 Today’s developing nations,
like their historical predecessors, often confront problems of small administrative infras-
tructure. Effective states cannot be taken for granted.
While there is a large econometric literature on the economic effects of democracy,
the corresponding literature on state capacity is small.2 This paper tests the long-run
relationship between state capacity and economic performance in Europe, the birthplace
of modern economic growth. To the best of our knowledge, it is among the first papers
to systematically test this relationship.3
We argue that two political transformations resolved long-standing state capacity
problems of fiscal fragmentation and absolutism faced by national governments. The
first political transformation was the implementation of uniform tax systems at the na-
tional level, or “fiscal centralization.” This transformation typically took place from 1789
onward. The second political transformation was the establishment of national parlia-
ments with the ability to monitor state expenditures at regular intervals, or “limited
government.” This transformation typically took place decades after fiscal centraliza-
tion over the 1800s. We argue that both fiscal centralization and limited government
increased the state’s capacity to extract greater tax revenues. Furthermore, we argue that
greater state capacity had positive economic implications through several potential chan-
nels, including the creation of administrative infrastructure. We discuss our hypotheses
at length in Section 2.
We evaluate our argument in two steps. We first test the direct relationship between
1For historical state formation, see Hintze (1906), Tilly (1975, 1990), Mathias and O’Brien (1976), Levi (1988),
Brewer (1989), Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997), Epstein (2000), O’Brien (2001, 2011), Dincecco (2009, 2011), Kara-
man and Pamuk (2010, 2013), Rosenthal and Wong (2011), and Gennaioli and Voth (2012). For state capacity
problems in sub-saharan Africa, see Migdal (1988), Herbst (2000), and Bates (2001). By contrast, states have
played important development roles in Asian Tiger nations. See Wade (1990), Kang (2002), and Rodrik (2005).
2Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) provides a recent overview of the democracy and growth literature. A
recent literature expands standard economic theory to incorporate state capacity. See Acemoglu et al. (2004),
Acemoglu (2005), Besley and Persson (2009, 2011, 2013), and Acemoglu et al. (2011).
3Bockstette et al. (2002) finds a significant positive link between state antiquity and current economic devel-
opment. Besley and Persson (2009, 2011) show significant positive correlations between past wars and current
fiscal and economic outcomes. Dincecco and Prado (2012) finds a significant positive relationship between
current fiscal capacity and economic performance. They use historical war casualties to instrument for current
fiscal institutions.
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political transformations and economic performance. Our econometric analysis uses a
novel annual database that spans eleven European countries from the height of the Old
Regime in 1650 to the eve of World War I in 1913, allowing for a unique comparison of the
economic and fiscal performance of different political regimes over a long time frame. We
model economic growth as a function of political transformations, country fixed effects
that account for time-invariant country characteristics, year fixed effects that account
for common time shocks, time-varying controls, and country-specific time trends that
account for unobserved time-varying country-level heterogeneity.
The results show a significant direct role for fiscal centralization in long-run economic
performance. We find that fiscally centralized regimes saw an average annual growth
rate in real per capita GDP that was 0.17 to 0.43 percent higher than fiscally fragmented
regimes. To put these magnitudes into perspective, the average annual per capita GDP
growth rate among sample countries over the 1650-1913 period was 0.62 percent. Our
estimates thus suggest that the growth improvements associated with fiscal centraliza-
tion were equivalent to 27 to 69 percent of the average per capita GDP growth rate over
this period, and 8 to 20 percent of its standard deviation. For another perspective, Pa-
paioannou and Siourounis (2008) find that post-1960 democratic transitions were associ-
ated with a 1 percent increase in annual real per capita GDP growth during a period for
which the world average annual growth rate was roughly 1.8 percent (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004, p. 4). This comparison suggests that fiscal centralization was of roughly
the same economic importance historically as some scholars argue that democratization
is today.4 Furthermore, we show evidence that the relationship between fiscal central-
ization and economic growth was not just transitory but long-lasting: the long-run per
capita GDP growth rate of fiscally centralized regimes was 0.16 to 0.33 percentage points
higher than fiscally fragmented regimes. While we do not find evidence for a significant
direct relationship between limited government and economic performance, the results
suggest large interaction effects between the two political transformations.
There are several potential mechanisms through which political transformations could
have improved economic performance. The second part of our econometric analysis
tests one specific mechanism, greater state capacity, using the same methodology as be-
fore to isolate the within-country correlation between political transformations and fiscal
outcomes. The results show that fiscally centralized and, to some extent, limited gov-
ernment regimes extracted per capita revenues at significantly higher rates than fiscally
4Several authors including Barro (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) do not find a significant relationship
between democracy and economic growth.
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fragmented regimes or absolutist regimes, respectively. Furthermore, there is some ev-
idence for a significant relationship between limited government and improvements in
the state’s capacity to productively spend government funds. Finally, we show evidence
for significant links between extractive capacity and subsequent economic performance:
a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that roughly 15 to 30 percent of the
total long-run per capita GDP growth improvements associated with fiscal centralization
went through the state capacity mechanism.
To conclude our analysis, we perform placebo tests that recode political transforma-
tions as if they had taken place decades prior to the actual years. The results provide
additional evidence that reverse causation did not drive the relationships between po-
litical transformations and the economic and fiscal outcomes that we find. We discuss
potential threats to inference and how we address them at length in Section 4.
Overall, the econometric analysis supports our argument that political transforma-
tions improved economic performance. The direct relationship between fiscal central-
ization and economic growth is significant, large, and robust. Furthermore, we find
evidence that greater state capacity was one mechanism through which both fiscal cen-
tralization and, to some extent, limited government played significant economic roles.
Our results also highlight the role of non-fiscal mechanisms through which fiscal central-
ization worked. Taken as a whole, our analysis suggests that fiscal centralization rather
than limited government was the most consequential political change to take place in
Europe over the 1650-1913 period.
Our paper relates to the literature that tests the long-run relationships between histor-
ical institutional factors and economic performance, including Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005),
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), and Nunn (2008). However, this literature does not typically
emphasize the role of state capacity. Furthermore, it does not often test specific mecha-
nisms through which institutional factors persist.5
Our paper also relates to the literature that views the state as an active participant in
the development of modern capitalist systems, including Gerschenkron (1966), Magnus-
son (2009), and O’Brien (2011). We provide an econometric counterpart to these works.
Our paper thus contributes to the debate about the institutional origins of the Industrial
Revolution (Mokyr, 2008).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the historical background
and develops the fiscal and economic implications. Section 3 describes the data. Section
5See Nunn (2009). Dell (2010) is a recent exception.
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4 presents the econometric methodology. Section 5 reports the estimation results for the
direct relationship between political transformations and economic performance. Section
6 reports the estimation results for the state capacity mechanism. Section 7 performs the
placebo tests. Section 8 concludes.
2 Historical Overview
This section characterizes two political transformations that we argue resolved key state
capacity problems in European history. Our historical account follows Dincecco (2009,
2011), which also provide sources. We first describe the political transformations, and
then discuss potential mechanisms through which greater state capacity could improve
economic performance.
2.1 Political Transformations
Fiscal Centralization
Most European states were fiscally fragmented before the nineteenth century. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, early modern monarchs faced a host of incumbent local insti-
tutions that reduced their extractive powers. Epstein (2000, pp. 13-14) writes that
decades of research on pre-modern political practices. . . has shown how “ab-
solutism” was a largely propagandistic device devoid of much practical sub-
stance. . . The strength of a monarch’s theoretical claims to absolute rule was
frequently inversely proportional to his de facto powers.
One general feature of fragmented states was the close relationship between local tax
control and political autonomy. Local elites had strong incentives to oppose national
fiscal reforms that threatened their traditional tax rights. The result was a classic public
goods problem. Since each local authority attempted to free-ride on the tax contributions
of other locales, the tax revenues that national governments could extract per capita were
low.
To resolve the problem of local tax free-riding and establish greater extractive capac-
ity, national governments had to gain the fiscal authority to impose standard tax menus,
rather than bargain place by place over individual tax rates. So long as states equalized
tax rates across locales at relatively high levels, extractive capacity rose.
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Limited Government
Although absolutist monarchs in early modern Europe spent government funds as they
wished, elites in national parliaments exercised tax authority. Hoffman and Rosenthal
(1997) argue that the main goal of absolutist monarchs was to fight wars, both for per-
sonal glory and for homeland defense. A key reason was the problem of royal moral
hazard in warfare (Cox, 2011). In Hoffman’s (2009, p. 24) words, absolutist monarchs
overspent on the military and provided more defense than their citizens likely
desired. But they had little reason not to. Victory. . . won them glory, enhanced
reputations, and resources. . . Losses never cost them their throne.
Since parliamentary elites feared that absolutist monarchs would spend additional
revenues in wasteful ways like foreign military adventures, they demanded the power of
budgetary oversight before raising new taxes. To evade parliament, absolutist monarchs
resorted to fiscal predation, which reinforced the fear that they could not be trusted.
Parliamentary elites thus resisted tax requests and government revenues per capita were
low.
Regular control over state budgets established the fiscal supremacy of parliament.
The surrender of budgetary control was a credible way to resolve the royal moral hazard
problem in warfare. In turn, extractive capacity rose.6
2.2 Economic Implications
Our historical account suggests that both fiscal centralization and limited government
increased extractive capacity. We now discuss potential channels through which greater
state capacity could have improved economic performance.
Besley and Persson (2013) argue that the state’s extractive capacity is central to eco-
nomic development.7 They show strong correlations between fiscal capacity investments
in administrative infrastructure, high tax levels, and economic prosperity. Following this
lead, we focus on the creation of administrative infrastructure or “infrastructural power”
(Mann, 1986) as a potential channel linking greater state capacity with improved eco-
nomic performance. States can facilitate economic activity in several ways, including
6We base this argument on North and Weingast (1989). Scholars argue that factors beyond de jure par-
liamentary change, including political coalitions (Stasavage, 2003), de facto institutional reforms (Pincus and
Robinson, 2010), and ministerial responsibility (Cox, 2011), were important to subsequent fiscal and economic
outcomes in European history.
7Their argument follows a long tradition that includes Schumpeter (1918) and Kaldor (1963).
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the provision of secure property rights, basic market regulations, and dispute resolution
through courts. To erect the administrative infrastructure that facilitates this activity,
states require sufficient revenues.8 For example, Brewer (1989) relates England’s histor-
ical military and economic rise to the establishment of limited government and greater
extractive capacity following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the subsequent growth
in administrative infrastructure. By contrast, Herbst (2000) links low revenues in Africa
with weak administrative infrastructures and the lack of basic public services (e.g., secu-
rity, courts) that facilitate economic activity.
While we emphasize the state’s extractive role, a potential complementary channel is
the state’s capacity to play a productive economic role through the provision of growth-
enhancing public services like education or physical infrastructure (Besley and Persson,
2013). By resolving the problem of royal moral hazard in warfare as described in the
previous subsection, the establishment of limited government could have led to greater
productive capacity. There is also reason to think that the centralized provision of par-
ticular public services was more growth-enhancing than the decentralized provision of
similar services. For example, historical central government investments in mass pri-
mary education promoted common national languages and cultural identities (Lindert,
2004, Aghion et al., 2012), which could have facilitated trade and innovation.
Political transformations could have also improved economic performance through
non-fiscal mechanisms. Institutional fragmentation in early modern Europe imposed
costs, delays, and risks that atomized domestic economies and reduced economic growth
(Epstein, 2000). Although taxes were low overall, fiscal fragmentation led to high tax
rates in sectors under royal control (Hoffman and Rosenthal, 1997). To prevent resource
diversion into tax-exempt sectors, absolutist monarchs enacted rigid laws. By resolv-
ing this problem, fiscal centralization increased investment mobility. Similarly, there are
several potential mechanisms linking limited government with improved economic per-
formance (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). For example, representative rule can fa-
cilitate sound economic policy through efficient information gathering and transmission
(Sen, 1999). Our empirical analysis accounts for the economic role of non-fiscal mecha-
nisms.
In summary, we argue that political transformations improved economic performance
8Prescott (e.g., 2004) argues that higher taxation accounts for the worker productivity shortfall in Europe
relative to the United States. Our analysis does not find any evidence of a negative relationship between greater
state capacity and economic performance. Still, there may be reason to think that different tax compositions
(e.g., income vs. consumption-type taxes) may affect economic performance when state capacity is already
high (e.g., at OECD-country levels).
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through greater state capacity. The rest of the paper tests this argument. We first examine
the direct relationship between political transformations and economic performance. We
then examine the role of state capacity, by testing the links from political transformations
to state capacity, and from state capacity to economic performance.
3 Data
3.1 Political Transformations
We define and code political transformations according to Dincecco (2009, 2011). The
process of fiscal centralization was completed the year that the national government first
secured its revenues through a standard tax system with uniform rates throughout the
country. Limited government was established the year that parliament gained the stable
constitutional right to control the national budget on an annual basis. To ensure stability,
parliament’s power of the purse had to hold for at least two consecutive decades.9
Table 1 displays the dates for fiscal centralization across sample countries. The Nor-
man Conquest of 1066 undercut provincial authority in England and established a preco-
cious uniformity of laws and customs.10 Structural fiscal change took place swiftly and
permanently in several parts of continental Europe after the fall of the Old Regime. The
National Assembly transformed the French tax system during the Revolution (1789-99),
a process completed by Napoleon upon taking power in 1799. The First French Republic
conquered the Low Countries in 1795, and the Southern Netherlands including Belgium
became French departments. The Batavian Republic, the successor to the Dutch Repub-
lic, established a national tax system under French rule in 1806. French conquest at the
start of the 1800s was also the major catalyst for fiscal change on the Italian peninsula.
France annexed Piedmont in 1802. Prussia undertook fiscal centralization after a battle
loss to France in 1806. Napoleon defeated Austria in 1805 and invaded Portugal in 1807
9There is a close correspondence between this coding scheme and the schemes of De Long and Shleifer
(1993), Acemoglu et al. (2005), and the Polity IV database of Jaggers and Marshall (2008). De Long and Shleifer
(1993) use three measures: a binary indicator of absolutist versus non-absolutist regimes, an eight-point con-
stitutional scale, and the categories of capital versus coercion from Tilly (1990). However, they code political
regimes at 150-year intervals. Acemoglu et al. (2005) use two measures: categories of executive constraints and
protection for capital, both from Jaggers and Marshall (2008). However, they code political regimes at 50- or
100-year internals. While Jaggers and Marshall (2008) code executive constraints at yearly intervals, their data
do not start until the 1800s.
10England conjoined with Wales in 1536. The Act of Union of 1707 conjoined Scotland. A similar Act con-
joined Ireland in 1800 (the Irish Free State was established in 1922). For consistency, we use the term “England”
rather than “Great Britain” or the “United Kingdom” throughout the text.
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and Spain in 1808, but only implemented incomplete administrative reforms. Fiscal cen-
tralization did not take place in Austria and Spain until the 1840s and in Portugal until
the 1850s.11 Traditional fiscal structures remained in Scandinavia well through the 1800s.
Fiscal centralization took place in Sweden in 1861 and in Denmark in 1903.
Table 2 displays the dates for limited government, which was typically established
decades after fiscal centralization over the 1800s.12 Belgium was established as a con-
stitutional monarchy after declaring independence from the Netherlands in 1830. In the
Netherlands, the new constitution of 1848 called for the executive to submit annual bud-
gets to parliament.13 Kings Charles Albert of Piedmont and Frederick William IV of
Prussia also granted liberal constitutions in 1848.14 The Compromise of 1867 marked
the start of the constitutional era in Austria. Limited government was established in
France after the capture of Emperor Napoleon III during war with Prussia.15 A stable
parliamentary regime was established in Spain in 1876. Limited government and fiscal
centralization took place within a decade of each other in Portugal and Sweden. A stable
constitutional regime was established in Portugal in 1851, while the 1866 parliamentary
reform in Sweden established a modern bicameral legislature.16 Finally, limited govern-
ment was established well before fiscal centralization in the Dutch Republic (1572-1795)
and in Denmark. The Dutch Republic is typically classified as constitutional (De Long
and Shleifer, 1993, Acemoglu et al., 2005, Stasavage, 2005), while King Frederick VII of
Denmark established a two-chambered parliament after the 1848 revolutions.
One concern is the possibility of measurement error induced by the coding scheme for
political transformations. The scheme codes fiscally fragmented regimes as wholly frag-
mented, even for states where fiscal divisions were small. Thus, some regimes coded as
fragmented will include data associated with greater extractive capacity, reducing aver-
age capacity improvements after fiscal centralization. Similarly, the scheme selects early
11Austria and Hungary were the largest territories of the Austrian Empire (1804-67). The Compromise of
1867 led to the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918). For consistency, we use the term
“Austria” throughout the text.
12Elster (2000, ch. 2) argues that the establishment of many modern constitutional governments was non-
incremental and took place in moments of crisis. Also see Russell (2004, p. 106). We thank Barry Weingast for
alerting us to these works.
13The constitution under King William I (1815-40) gave parliament the right to audit state finances, but only
at 10-year intervals (van Zanden and van Riel, 2010).
14Tilly (1966) and Ziblatt (2006, pp. 113-16) alike code the post-1848 regime in Prussia as constitutional,
although Tilly notes that the executive acted without legislative approval of military budgets during the 1860s.
15The July Monarchy of King Louis Philip (1830-48) was not coded as limited because it endured for less
than two decades.
16Sweden enacted a constitution in 1809, but the executive retained absolute veto authority and parliament
only met once every five years.
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dates for limited government. Because extractive capacity typically increased over time,
some regimes that were coded as limited will include data associated with lower extrac-
tive capacity, reducing average capacity improvements. The systematic underestimation
of the state capacity impacts of fiscal centralization and limited government should bias
the data against our hypotheses that political transformations improved economic per-
formance by enabling states to effectively fulfill their extractive role.
More generally, the various ways in which early modern states tabulated annual
revenues suggests that, on average, they overestimated the amounts of available re-
sources.17 Pre-transformation regimes will thus appear to have greater extractive capac-
ity. State accounting practices improved over time, reducing the number and magnitude
of overestimates. These two features also bias the data against our hypotheses about
the relationships between political transformations, extractive capacity, and economic
performance.
3.2 Economic Performance
Our economic performance measure is the (logarithmic) annual growth rate of real per
capita GDP from Maddison (2010).18 These data are available for 1600, 1700, and an-
nually from 1820 to 1913. We linearly interpolate the pre-1820 data to provide annual
observations from 1650 onward for all years for which state capacity data are also avail-
able.
Figure 1 displays the time-demeaned average per capita GDP growth rates around
political transformations. The top panel shows average per capita GDP growth rates for
fifty years before and after fiscal centralization (left panel) and limited government (right
panel). Both political transformations were associated with economic improvements.
The average per capita GDP growth rate for fiscally centralized regimes was around
0.90 percent, but only around 0.20 percent for fiscally fragmented regimes. Similarly, the
average per capita GDP growth rate for limited government regimes (also around 0.90
percent) was high relative to absolutist regimes (around 0.35 percent).
The bottom panel zooms in on average per capita GDP growth rates for ten years be-
fore and after political transformations. We observe a sharp, sustained jump in per capita
17Bonney (1995, pp. 423-506) and O’Brien (2011, pp. 408-20) discuss the limitations of historical budgetary
data.
18GDP data from Barro and Ursu´a (2010), a potential alternative, are not widely available before the 1850s.
However, the post-1850 trends are similar to the Maddison data.
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GDP growth rates in the decade after fiscal centralization.19 While there was a smaller
jump associated with limited government, it was not sustained. The zoom view also
suggests that per capita GDP growth slowed in the years just before political transfor-
mations, raising the possibility that regular recovery from economic downturns rather
than political change drove the growth improvements that we observe. Section 4 de-
scribes how we address this concern.
3.3 State Capacity
Our main state capacity measure uses per capita national government revenues to proxy
for the state’s extractive capacity. The revenue and population data are from Dincecco
(2011) and Dincecco et al. (2011). Our second measure uses per capita non-military ex-
penditures by national governments to proxy for the state’s productive capacity. Data
that are disaggregated beyond non-military expenditures (e.g., education) are only avail-
able for a reduced number of sample countries. The Appendix describes the sources and
construction methods for the spending data.
The fiscal data form an unbalanced panel. We linearly interpolate, but never extrapo-
late, any missing revenue data to provide annual observations from 1650 to 1913. We also
linearly interpolate population data between census years. The non-military spending
data are not widely available before 1816. We do not interpolate any missing expendi-
ture observations, because the links between tax bases and government spending were
not always straightforward (e.g., during wartime).
Simple calculations show that the average annual growth rate of per capita revenues
for fiscally centralized regimes (1.76 percent) was more than twice as high as for fis-
cally fragmented regimes (0.82 percent). Likewise, the average annual growth rate of per
capita revenues for limited government regimes was 1.60 percent, but only 1.14 percent
for absolutist regimes, a difference of 0.46 percentage points. The share of non-military
expenditures in total expenditures also increased by roughly 13 percentage points after
both fiscal centralization and limited government.
Finally, we use cumulative railway networks in miles from Bogart (2008) as a non-
fiscal proxy for the state’s “infrastructural power.”20
19Structural break tests for real per capita GDP levels using Bai and Perron (2003)’s algorithm indicate that
the 95 percent confidence intervals for the structural breaks encompassed the dates of political transformations
for the majority of countries in the sample.
20Even if the state does not directly finance, build, or operate transport systems, it can play a key role as
facilitator (see Section 2). We thus favor the total railway network to the government-built part of the network
as the proper measure. However, the econometric results for the relationship between fiscally centralized
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4 Econometric Methodology
To test the direct relationship between political transformations and economic perfor-
mance, we estimate the benchmark regression equation
∆yi,t = α0 + α1Ci,t + α2Li,t + X′i,t−1α3 + µi + λt + ei,t. (1)
The dependent variable is the (logarithmic) annual growth rate of real per capita GDP
in country i between t− 1 and t. The fixed effects µi account for time-invariant country
characteristics including geography, the nature and quality of initial political institutions
(Bockstette et al., 2002, Acemoglu et al., 2005), initial economic and technological condi-
tions (Comin et al., 2010), and cultural norms (Greif and Tabellini, 2010), while the fixed
effects λt account for common time shocks. The vector X′i,t−1 includes an external con-
flict dummy for each year that a sample country participated in an European war, an
internal conflict dummy for each year of civil war, coup, or revolution, and a control
for annual population growth. Ci,t and Li,t are dummy variables that take the value 1
upon fiscal centralization and limited government, respectively, in country i (and take
the value 0 beforehand). The coefficients α1 and α2 thus provide within-country esti-
mates of the relationships between the two political transformations and economic per-
formance.
Equation 1 addresses several common limitations of the cross-country growth litera-
ture (Durlauf et al., 2005). Country fixed effects account for time-invariant characteristics
and initial conditions that may influence economic and political development alike. Fur-
thermore, by including lags of the dependent variable among the regressors in some
specifications, we not only account for autocorrelation and growth persistence, but can
also quantify the short- and long-run relationships between political transformations and
economic and fiscal outcomes.21
However, a set of methodological challenges still remains. A first concern is reverse
causation. Economic growth may promote political reforms and not vice versa (e.g.,
Glaeser et al., 2004; see Acemoglu et al., 2008, for a counterargument). Beyond classic
regimes and government-built railway networks were similar to those reported. Data limitations prevented us
from testing this relationship for limited government regimes.
21The bias induced by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in least square dummy variable (LSDV)
models decreases with the panel’s time dimension T (Nickell, 1981). Judson and Owen (1999) show that the
LSDV estimator outperforms alternative dynamic panel data models when T is 30; for our unbalanced panel
with annual observations, T ranges from 50 to 264, with an average value of 194. Furthermore, Judson and
Owen show that the bias for the coefficients of the other regressors, including the those of our variables of
interest, Ci,t and Li,t, is small. For robustness, we used lagged observations dated t− 2 and earlier to instrument
for ∆yi,t−1 following (Bond et al., 2010), and implemented the bias-corrected LSDV estimator proposed by
Bruno (2005a,b). The results were similar to those reported.
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reverse causation, the growth estimates will be upwardly biased if political transforma-
tions took place during an economic upswing, because the coefficients α1 and α2 would
reflect this trend. Similarly, if political transformations took place during an economic
downturn, then the estimates may simply reflect the impacts of regular recovery that
would have taken place even without political change.
We address this concern in several ways. To test whether political transformations
took place during economic upswings or downturns, we allow for time-varying im-
pacts of political transformations (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005, Laporte and Windmeijer,
2005). We also perform placebo tests (Bertrand et al., 2004, Abadie et al., 2010, Stasavage,
2013) that recode political transformations as if they had taken place decades prior to the
actual dates. Finally, we implement the Granger-style causality test proposed by Angrist
and Pischke (2009, ch. 5).
A second concern is omitted variable bias. While fixed effects control for constant
unobserved country-level heterogeneity, they do not account for the potential omission
of relevant time-varying explanatory variables that could be correlated with political
transformations. To address this possibility, we modify our benchmark model to include
country-specific time trends.22 Similarly, we allow for income level differences and con-
trol for convergence dynamics by including lagged real per capita GDP in X′i,t−1 in some
specifications.
There are other concerns related to the unique historical nature of our database. Our
benchmark model uses cluster-robust standard errors that accommodate heteroskedas-
ticity and within-cluster correlation. However, the number of sample countries (i.e., 11) is
small, which may bias downward the standard errors (Donald and Lang, 2007, Cameron
et al., 2008). For robustness, the regression tables also report p-values for the two-sided
Wald hypothesis tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t
procedure. This procedure is useful for small sample sizes like ours because it does not
rely on asymptotic approximations.23
Although we use a wide variety of techniques to address the various methodologi-
cal concerns, our within-country estimates do not necessarily capture the causal effects
of political transformations on economic and fiscal outcomes. The historical record in-
dicates that the causes and consequences of political transformations were the result of
22Country-specific time trends also help account for the non-stationarity of the political reform dummies,
since once sample countries adopted centralized and limited regimes they typically did not revert.
23To account for cross-sectional dependence beyond that captured by time fixed effects, we also computed
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal dependence
regardless of the size of N. The results were similar to those reported.
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complex interactions between a broad host of factors, some of which our econometric
framework invariably omits. While our estimates are not causal in nature, we believe
that our analysis contributes to the literature by highlighting novel data patterns about
the relationships between political transformations, state capacity, and economic perfor-
mance.
5 Political Transformations and Economic Performance
Table 3 displays the benchmark estimation results for the direct relationship between
political transformations and annual real per capita GDP growth.24 Column 1 reports
the results for the static panel model with country fixed effects. There were significant
positive growth improvements after both fiscal centralization and limited government.
Fiscally centralized regimes saw an average annual per capita GDP growth rate that was
0.66 percent higher than fiscally fragmented regimes, while limited government regimes
saw an average annual per capita GDP growth rate 0.32 percent higher than absolutist
regimes. Column 2 controls for common time shocks by introducing year fixed effects.
The coefficient for Ci,t falls to 0.22, but is still more than two standard deviations greater
than zero. The coefficient for Li,t is no longer significant. A potential explanation is that,
because the establishment of limited government typically took place just before or dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 1998), it may be difficult to disentangle the two
events. To account for unobserved time-varying country-level heterogeneity, Column 3
introduces country-specific time trends to the Column 2 specification. There is a small
increase in the magnitude of the coefficient for fiscal centralization, which remains sig-
nificant.
Columns 4 and 5 test potential interactions between the two political transformations.
In this context, the individual coefficients for Ci,t and Li,t measure the economic impacts
of fiscal centralization and limited government, respectively, when the transformation in
question was undertaken in the absence of the other, while the coefficient for Ci,t × Li,t
measures the non-additive impact of the two political transformations combined. Col-
umn 6 shows that the coefficients for Ci,t and Ci,t × Li,t are positive, but not significant. It
24We tested the time series properties of the main variables by performing common panel-data unit root
tests (e.g., Maddala and Wu, 1999, Levin, Lin, and Chu, 2002, Im et al., 2003) with and without country-specific
trends. All tests failed to reject the hypothesis that the (log) level of per capita GDP contains unit roots for
every sample country. However, the null was always rejected when this variable was first-differenced. These
tests also suggest that the state capacity measures are stationary. Still, given the well-known reservations about
the power and reliability of these tests (Baltagi, 2005), we report results in Sections 5 and 6 for a broad range of
specifications that take into account both theoretical considerations and time series properties.
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is well-known that time fixed effects impose large costs in terms of lost degrees of free-
dom for very long panels like ours (Wooldridge, 2003, Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). To
address this potential problem, Column 7 repeats the previous specification after replac-
ing the year fixed effects with a linear time trend to account for common time shocks.
Now the coefficient for fiscal centralization is significant, with a point estimate of 0.25.
Furthermore, the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.31 and is significant. This result
suggests that the joint impact of political transformations was notably greater than the
sum of the individual impacts. Holding all else constant, the average annual per capita
GDP growth rate for a country in our sample where limited government followed fiscal
centralization was 1 percent, but only 0.63 percent if the second political transformation
was never undertaken.
Columns 6 and 7 repeat the specifications in Column 2 (country and year fixed effects)
and Column 3 (plus country-specific time trends) for the dynamic panel model that in-
troduces two lags of the dependent variable to account for growth persistence.25 The
coefficient for fiscal centralization remains significant, with an increase in the annual per
capita GDP growth rate of 0.29 to 0.34 percent. Furthermore, the dynamic panel results
indicate that fiscally centralized regimes not only saw a short-run increase in growth,
but also a significant increase in long-run per capita GDP growth rates of 0.22 to 0.25
percentage points per year.26
Table 4 tests the robustness of the main results. Column 1 introduces the controls
for external and internal conflicts and population growth to the static panel model with
country and year fixed effects. Column 2 adds country-specific time trends to this spec-
ification. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients for fiscal centralization are
similar as before. None of the controls have systematic growth impacts.27
There is the possibility that our previous results conflate the direct economic impacts
of fiscal centralization with the advent of modern industrial growth, which took place
throughout Europe from the 1850s onward (Mokyr, 1998). Column 3 thus restricts the
25As shown, both lags are statistically significant. A model with a single lag, the structure favored by
commonly-used information criteria (AIC, BIC), leads to nearly identical estimates for the political reform
indicators. We also tested longer lag structures of up to 8 lags to mimic other specifications present in the long-
run growth literature (e.g., Gemmell et al., 2011). The results for α1 and α2 were unchanged. Finally, allowing
for different lag lengths for each sample country did not significantly alter these results.
26The delta method was used to compute standard errors for the long-run growth estimates.
27If we allow for contemporaneous correlations between the time-varying controls and ∆yi,t, then the neg-
ative coefficients for external conflict and population growth become statistically significant. However, the
estimated relationship between fiscal centralization and economic growth is unchanged. We report the results
that exclude contemporaneous correlations to address concerns about the possible endogeneity of the controls
(Jones, 1995, Gemmell et al., 2011).
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previous specification to the period before 1845. The magnitude of the coefficient for Ci,t
increases to 0.32 and remains significant.
The next three columns report results for the dynamic panel model. Column 4 repeats
the Column 2 specification with country-specific time trends. The magnitude and signif-
icance of the coefficient for fiscal centralization resembles previous estimates. To control
for conditional convergence, Column 5 includes the three-year lag of log per capita GDP,
ln yi,t−3. The coefficient for Ci,t remains positive, but is no longer significant. Column 6
thus repeats the previous specification using a linear time trend as justified previously.
Now the coefficient for fiscal centralization is highly significant, with a point estimate of
0.43.
Columns 7 to 9 show the results that use averaged rather than annual data obser-
vations. Some scholars highlight the merits of using annual data in growth regressions
(Attanasio et al., 2000, Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008), while others argue that obser-
vations averaged over longer periods are more appropriate for growth determinants that
change slowly or infrequently (Durlauf et al., 2005). Taking data averages can also filter
out business cycle fluctuations and adjustments to occasional shocks (e.g., Islam, 1995,
Beck et al., 2000).28 Column 7 thus estimates the static model with country and year
fixed effects using five-year data averages.29 Columns 8 and 9 use 10- and 25-year aver-
ages, respectively. The main results obtained using the annual data hold for the averaged
data. Fiscal centralization saw significant growth improvements, while the coefficients
for limited government are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
To better assess the evolution of the relationships between political transformations
and economic performance, we relax the assumption that the impact of centralization
and limited government is constant over time and replace Ci,t and Li,t with five “pulse”
dummies each. The regression equation that we now estimate is
∆yi,t = α0 +
5
∑
j=1
α1,jC˜
j
i,t +
5
∑
j=1
α2,j L˜
j
i,t + X
′
i,t−1α3 + µi + λt + ei,t, (2)
where the first four pulse dummies span non-overlapping five-year intervals before and
after each political transformation: C˜1i,t, L˜
1
i,t = 1 for years 6 to 10 before; C˜
2
i,t, L˜
2
i,t = 1
for years 1 to 5 before; C˜3i,t, L˜
3
i,t = 1 for years 0 to 4 after (including the transformation
28Furthermore, data averages can help attenuate the effects of (transient) measurement errors, which may
be particularly relevant when using historical data (Barro, 2000, Bond et al., 2010).
29Since the average number of observations for the five-year averaged dataset is 39, the LSDV estimator is
still preferable to alternative models (Judson and Owen, 1999). While the generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) gives similar results to those reported, these results should be
interpreted with caution due to the well-known weaknesses of the GMM estimator for small N panels.
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year itself); and C˜4i,t, L˜
4
i,t = 1 for years 5 to 9 after. To measure the long-run relationships
between political transformations and economic performance, C˜5i,t and L˜
5
i,t take the value
1 from the tenth year post-transformation onward, and 0 otherwise.30
Figure 2 displays the results of this exercise. Neither “pre-treatment” dummy is sig-
nificant, which suggests that there were no systematic economic differences between the
decade prior to political transformations and the benchmark period (i.e., more than a
decade prior). To put it differently, the positive relationship between fiscal centralization
and economic performance that we find in Tables 3 and 4 does not appear to be driven by
regular recovery from any pre-transformation economic downturn, or by anticipatory ef-
fects. Nor do we find evidence for any significant economic changes in the first five years
post-transformation. This result may highlight the importance of “institutional consol-
idation” before any impacts of political transformations could be realized. By contrast,
the coefficient for C˜i,4 shows evidence for medium-run economic improvements. The av-
erage annual real per capita GDP growth rate was 0.48 percent higher 5 to 9 years after
fiscal centralization. This coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level. Similarly, fis-
cally centralized regimes saw highly significant economic improvements from the tenth
year post-transformation onward, with a long-run per capita GDP growth gain of 0.24
percentage points per year. The size of this coefficient resembles the long-run estimates
from the dynamic specifications in Tables 3 and 4.31
Overall, the analysis in this section shows an important direct role for fiscal central-
ization in economic performance. The coefficient estimates for Ci,t are significant, large,
and robust: fiscally centralized regimes grew faster than fiscally fragmented regimes by
an average of 0.17 to 0.43 percent higher per year. Given that the average annual real per
capita GDP growth rate among sample countries over the 1650-1913 period was 0.62 per-
cent, our estimates indicate that the growth improvements associated with fiscal central-
ization were equivalent to about one-quarter to two-thirds of the actual per capita GDP
growth rate over this period, and 8 to 20 percent of its standard deviation. As noted in the
introduction, these magnitudes suggest that fiscal centralization was roughly as impor-
30For robustness, we tested shorter and longer pulse dummy lengths and different numbers of pulse dum-
mies overall. We also tested a variation of Equation 2 that replaced just one political reform indicator with
pulse dummies but held the other indicator constant. The results of these tests consistently indicated a highly
significant positive long-run impact of Ci,t on per capita GDP growth.
31As another robustness check, we relaxed the assumption that the impact of political transformations was
the same for all cross-sectional units. In the spirit of Pesaran and Smith (1995)’s mean group-style estimator,
we estimated the dynamic models in Table 4 for each sample country and then averaged the coefficients. The
point estimate for the long-run relationship between fiscal centralization and economic growth was roughly
0.30 and was significant. While we interpret this result with caution due to the small N, it provides further
support for our main conclusions.
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tant historically to economic development as democratization is sometimes thought to
be today (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Furthermore, the economic improvements
associated with fiscal centralization were long-lasting. Fiscally centralized regimes saw
a significant increase in long-run per capita GDP growth rates of 0.16 to 0.33 percent-
age points per year. While the coefficient estimates for limited government are typically
positive, the direct relationship between this political transformation and economic per-
formance is not significant. However, we do find some evidence of significant interaction
effects between the two political transformations, such that the joint impact of fiscal cen-
tralization and limited government combined was much greater than the sum of each
transformation when undertaken independently.
As described in Section 2, there are several potential mechanisms through which po-
litical transformations could have improved economic performance. We now examine
one specific mechanism: greater state extractive and productive capacity.
6 Role of State Capacity
6.1 Political Transformations and State Capacity
To test for the relationship between political transformations and state capacity, we use
a modified version of Equation 1 which takes the dependent variable ∆Ei,t, the (logarith-
mic) annual growth rate of state capacity in country i between t− 1 and t.
Table 5 displays the estimation results for growth in per capita revenues, our measure
of the state’s extractive capacity. Column 1 shows the static panel model with country
and year fixed effects. There was a significant extractive capacity improvement after fis-
cal centralization. Fiscally centralized regimes saw an average annual growth rate of per
capita revenues that was 1.41 percent higher than fiscally fragmented regimes. The esti-
mate for limited government is positive, but not significant.32 Column 2 introduces the
standard time-varying controls. The magnitude of the estimate for Ci,t increases slightly
and remains significant.
Column 3 introduces country-specific time trends. The coefficient for fiscal central-
ization increases further to 2.93 and remains significant. The estimate for Li,t becomes
significant (for p-values computed using cluster-robust standard errors) once we replace
the year fixed effects with a linear time trend to reduce the cost of lost degrees of freedom
32However, if we use log per capita revenue levels as the dependent variable and re-run the Table 5 regres-
sions, then the estimates for limited government are nearly always significant.
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as in Column 4.
Column 5 restricts the Column 3 specification to the pre-1845 data to further con-
trol for the potential fiscal impacts of the Industrial Revolution. The coefficient for Ci,t
roughly doubles in size to 6.61. The coefficient for Li,t is also large and significant.33
Columns 6 and 7 repeat the specifications in Columns 3 and 4 for the dynamic panel
model with two lags of the dependent variable. The estimates for both fiscal centraliza-
tion and limited government are similar in magnitude and significance as before.34 Fur-
thermore, these estimates indicate that fiscally centralized regimes saw a large increase
in the long-run growth rate of per capita revenues of 2.89 to 3.02 percentage points per
year.
To account for conditional convergence, Column 8 includes the three-year lag of log
per capita revenues, ln Ei,t−3, in the specification from Column 6. The coefficient for
Ci,t is again large and significant. The results also indicate that fiscal centralization was
associated with a significant increase in (log) per capita revenue levels of 37 percent over
the long run.35
Table 6 displays the estimates for the model with country and year fixed effects,
time-varying controls, and country-specific time trends for our alternative state capac-
ity measures. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for growth in per capita non-military
expenditures, our measure of the state’s productive capacity. In line with the theoretical
implications as described in Section 2, the coefficient for limited government is always
positive and becomes significant (for p-values computed using cluster-robust standard
errors) once we control for conditional convergence in the dynamic panel model as in
Column 2.
For contrast, Column 3 shows the results for growth in per capita military expendi-
tures. Unlike the previous results, there is no evidence that limited government regimes
saw increases in the average annual growth rate of per capita military expenditures (the
coefficient for Li,t is negative). This comparison supports the case that the establishment
of limited government was associated with changes toward non-military spending. The
estimates for fiscal centralization are never significant across these specifications.
Recall from Section 3 that expenditure data disaggregated beyond military expen-
33Unlike for economic growth, the Table 5 regressions do not show evidence of significant interaction effects
between the two political transformations.
34These results are also robust to shorter or longer lag structures.
35We computed the long-run impact on per capita revenue levels as minus the ratio of the coefficients for Ci,t
and ln Ei,t−1, with standard errors obtained using the delta method (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Run-
ning the specification with ln Ei,t as the dependent variable and re-running the Column 6 regression indicates
that fiscal centralization saw a significant short-term annual increase in per capita revenue levels of 4 percent.
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ditures are not widely available. With this important caveat in mind, Columns 4 and
5 show the results for growth in per capita education expenditures for the static and
dynamic panel models, respectively. The estimates for Li,t are positive, large, and signifi-
cant. These results suggest that education was one non-military item upon which limited
government regimes spent funds. Again, the estimates for Ci,t are not significant.
Columns 6 and 7 show the results for growth in cumulative railway networks, our
non-fiscal state capacity measure. The coefficients for Li,t, while positive, are not signifi-
cant for this measure. By contrast, the coefficient for Ci,t becomes significant (for p-values
computed using cluster-robust standard errors) once we account for conditional conver-
gence in the dynamic panel model as in Column 7. This result provides some further
evidence that fiscal centralization enhanced the “infrastructural power” of states.
In summary, Table 5 shows an important role for political transformations in greater
state capacity. The estimates indicate that fiscally centralized regimes and, to some ex-
tent, limited government regimes extracted per capita revenues at significantly higher
rates than fiscally fragmented regimes or absolutist regimes, respectively. Fiscally cen-
tralized regimes saw an average annual growth rate of per capita revenues that was 1.41
to 4.27 percent higher than fiscally fragmented regimes. Given that the average annual
growth rate of per capita revenues over the 1650-1913 period was 1.36 percent, these
estimates are sizeable. Furthermore, the extractive capacity improvements associated
with fiscal centralization were enduring. Fiscally centralized regimes saw an increase
in long-run growth rates of per capita revenues of 1.54 to 1.65 percentage points per
year. While Table 6 shows some evidence for a significant relationship between limited
government and productive capacity improvements, this evidence is less robust. Taken
together, these results suggest that political transformations had more important conse-
quences for extractive capacity than for productive capacity. To complete the analysis
of the state capacity mechanism, we now test for the relationship between state capacity
and economic performance.
6.2 State Capacity and Economic Performance
Following Bond et al. (2010), the benchmark regression equation that we estimate is
∆yi,t = β0 +
2
∑
j=1
β j∆ Ei,t−j + β3ln Ei,t−3 + X′i,t−1β4 + µi + λt + ei,t, (3)
where, as before, ∆yi,t is the (logarithmic) annual growth rate of real per capita GDP in
country i between t− 1 and t, ∆Ei,t−j, j = 1, 2, are the first two lags of the (logarithmic)
20
annual growth rate of state capacity, and ln Ei,t−3 is the three-year lag of the state capacity
measure in log levels.36
Table 7 displays the estimation results. The first five columns test per capita revenues,
our measure of the state’s extractive capacity. Column 1 shows the results for the static
panel model with country and year fixed effects. Column 2 introduces the standard
time-varying controls. Column 3 adds country-specific time trends. There is a significant
relationship between extractive capacity improvements and subsequent per capita GDP
growth across all specifications: the coefficient of interest, ln Ei,t−3, is always positive and
significant, with values between 0.11 and 0.15.37 A comparison of eighteenth-century
England and France helps put these magnitudes into perspective. English per capita
revenues, which averaged 7.50 gold grams from 1700 to 1788, were more than double
the French average over this period, at 3.71 gold grams. Our estimates thus suggest that,
ceteris paribus, this difference in extractive capacity was associated with an annual per
capita GDP growth rate for England that was between 0.08 and 0.11 percentage points
higher than for France. Given that the actual average annual per capita GDP growth rate
for France over the 1700-88 period was 0.19, this magnitude is large.
Column 4 repeats the Column 3 specification for the dynamic panel model with two
lags of the dependent variable.38 The coefficient for ln Ei,t−3 remains highly significant
and increases in magnitude to 0.18, implying a long-term impact on the per capita GDP
growth rate of 0.13 percentage points per year. Recall that fiscal centralization was asso-
ciated with a significant long-run increase in per capita revenue (log) levels of 37 percent
(Column 8 of Table 5). A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation thus suggests that the
impact of fiscal centralization on the long-run annual per capita GDP growth rate that
went through the revenue channel was roughly 0.05 percentage points, or roughly 15 to
30 percent of the total long-run per capita GDP growth improvements associated with
this political transformation.
To further assess the relative importance of this mechanism, Column 5 shows the
results for the Column 3 specification after introducing the dummy variables for fiscal
centralization and limited government. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient
for ln Ei,t−3 is similar as before. The coefficient for fiscal centralization is also significant,
36We excluded contemporaneous correlations between ∆yi,t and the state capacity measures to address en-
dogeneity concerns (Jones, 1995, Gemmell et al., 2011). For robustness, we included either ∆Ei,t, ln Ei,t, or both
variables as regressors in Equation 3, using past values of the state capacity measures and historical variables
including state antiquity (Bockstette et al., 2002) and protection of capital (Acemoglu et al., 2002) as instru-
ments. The results were similar to those reported.
37These results are similar with shorter or longer lag structures.
38These results are also robust to shorter or longer lag structures for the dependent variable.
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with a similar point estimate (0.26) as the equivalent Section 5 specification (i.e., Column
2 of Table 4). Taken in combination, these results suggest that, while greater extractive
capacity was one mechanism through which fiscal centralization improved long-run eco-
nomic performance, non-fiscal mechanisms as described in Section 2 (e.g., reductions in
internal tariff barriers that increased investment mobility) were also of great significance.
Column 6 shows the results for growth in per capita non-military expenditures. The
coefficient for ln Ei,t−3 is negative and not significant. We do not report the results for the
other alternative state capacity measures, which were also not significant.
Overall, Tables 5, 6, and 7 show evidence that greater state capacity was one mech-
anism that linked political transformations with better economic performance. There is
a significant positive relationship between fiscal centralization and, to some extent, lim-
ited government and extractive capacity, and between greater extractive capacity and
economic growth. While we did not find evidence for a direct relationship between
limited government and economic performance in Section 5, these results suggest that
limited government played some indirect economic role through extractive capacity im-
provements. These results also indicate that fiscal centralization improved economic
performance through both fiscal and non-fiscal mechanisms. To conclude the analysis,
the next section uses placebo tests to further evaluate the robustness of the main results.
7 Placebo Tests
The historical evidence described in Section 3 highlights the role of critical junctures in
political transformations (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, ch. 4). Similarly, the results of
the pulse dummy exercise show no evidence of anticipatory effects during the decade
prior to political transformations (Figure 2 ). For further robustness, we now perform
placebo tests (Bertrand et al., 2004, Abadie et al., 2010, Stasavage, 2013) that address the
possibility that economic and fiscal differences across political regimes were the result
of underlying trends that preceded political transformations, rather than the transforma-
tions themselves. We recode political transformations as if they had taken place decades
prior to the actual dates and then re-estimate the static and dynamic models with coun-
try and year fixed effects and time-varying controls. If the coefficients for the placebo
transformations are not significant, then this analysis will reinforce our previous results
about the economic and fiscal importance of political transformations.
Table 8 displays the estimation results for the placebo tests. Panel A reports the results
when the dependent variable is annual real per capita GDP growth. Column 1 shows the
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results for the political transformation placebos 25 years prior to the actual dates, while
Columns 2 to 4 increase the placebos to 50, 75, and 100 years prior, respectively.39 The
coefficients for the fiscal centralization placebos are small, negative, and not significant.
For example, the 25-year placebo estimate in the static model is 0.007, versus 0.21 in the
original specification (Table 4, Column 1).
Panel B repeats the placebo tests when the dependent variable is per capita revenue
growth. The placebo coefficients for fiscal centralization or limited government are typi-
cally not significant, and the magnitudes are routinely smaller than in the original speci-
fications. More than 80 percent of the placebo estimates are negative.
Panel C estimates the placebo models when the dependent variable is per capita non-
military expenditure growth. We report the results for 25-, 30-, 35-, and 40- year placebos
(we cannot compute the 50-year placebo due to the lack of non-military expenditure
data prior to 1816). Nearly all of the coefficients for the limited government placebos are
negative, and none are significant.
As an even further robustness check for reverse causation, we implement the proce-
dure proposed by Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 5). Our main result from Section 5 is that
there is a significant relationship between fiscal centralization and annual real per capita
GDP growth. If Ci,t impacts ∆yi,t but not the other way around, then the coefficients for
the leads Ci,t+τ, τ = 1, . . . , q, should not be statistically significant in a regression of the
sort
∆yi,t = α0 + α1,0Ci,t +
q
∑
τ=1
α1,τCi,t+τ + α2Li,t + X′i,t−1α3 + µi + λt + ei,t. (4)
Figure 3 displays the results of this regression for two specifications: the first with q = 3
and no controls (left panel), and the second with q = 20, time-varying controls, and
country-specific trends (right panel).40 Only the coefficient for Ci,t remains significant
across specifications. The α1,τs alternate between positive and negative coefficients, with
p-values ranging from 0.13 to 0.81.
Overall, the results of the placebo and Angrist-Pischke tests provide additional ev-
idence that reverse causation does not drive the relationships between political trans-
formations and the economic and fiscal outcomes that we find. They thus reinforce our
previous findings.
39By way of comparison, the placebo tests in Stasavage (2013) recode the dates of political change (in this
case, the establishment of urban political autonomy in medieval Europe) 100 years prior to the actual dates.
40Using different specifications or q values, or simultaneously including leads for Ci,t and Li,t, leads to
broadly similar results.
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8 Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence about the long-run relationship between state capac-
ity and economic performance. We focus on Europe, the birthplace of modern economic
growth. National governments in European history were typically fiscally fragmented
and absolutist. We argue that both fiscal centralization and limited government in-
creased the state’s capacity to extract greater tax revenues, and that greater state capacity
had positive economic implications through the creation of administrative infrastructure
and other channels.
To test this argument, we perform a panel data analysis on a novel database that
spans eleven countries and four centuries. Our analysis accounts for potential biases
including simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved heterogeneity. Placebo tests
allow us to further evaluate the validity of our argument. The results suggest that fis-
cal centralization rather than limited government was the most consequential political
change to occur in Europe from the Old Regime to World War I. We find a significant
direct relationship between fiscal centralization and economic growth. Furthermore, we
find that greater state capacity was one mechanism through which fiscal centralization
and, to some extent, limited government played significant economic roles. To the best of
our knowledge, these results are among the first to show systematic evidence that state
capacity is a significant determinant of long-run economic growth.
Our analysis indicates that fiscal centralization operated through fiscal and non-fiscal
mechanisms alike. One useful extension would be to pin down the main non-fiscal mech-
anisms. We believe that our results take a first step that can help guide future research in
this direction.
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Data Appendix
Data for per capita tax revenues in gold grams from 1650 to 1913 are from Dincecco (2011,
appendices A.1, A.2, A.3). See Section 3 for further details.
Data sources for per capita military and education expenditures are listed ahead.41
Disaggregated expenditure data in home currencies were converted into gold grams fol-
lowing the methodology in Dincecco (2011, appendix A.2). Data for total expenditures
and population are from Dincecco (2011, appendices A.1, A.2) unless otherwise stated.
Per capita non-military expenditures were computed as per capita total expenditures
minus per capita military expenditures.
Austria. Military spending data are from Pammer (2010). Education expenditure data
were not available.
Belgium. Military spending data are from Singer (1987). They were downloaded from
the Correlates of War website as the National Military Capabilities Dataset, Version 4.0.
Education expenditure data were not available.
Denmark. Military spending data are from Singer (1987). They were downloaded from
the Correlates of War website as the National Military Capabilities Dataset, Version 4.0.
Education expenditure data were not available.
England. Military and education spending data are from Mitchell (1988, public finance
table 4). To compute military expenditures, spending for the Army and Ordnance and
for the Navy were summed. Education expenditures uses the category for Education,
Art, and Science.
France. Military and and education spending data are from Fontvieille (1976, tables
CVXI-XXXV).
Netherlands. Military spending data are from van Zanden (1996, table 4) for 1816-41. Van
Zanden provides data averages for 1816-20, 1821-4, 1825-9, 1831-4, 1835-9, and 1841-50.
The average for 1816-20 was used for 1816, the average for 1821-4 for 1821, and so on. The
military spending shares closely match those from van Zanden and van Riel (2010, table
2.1). Total expenditure data from this source were used in combination with the informa-
tion on shares to back out military expenditures. For 1816-30 we divided these figures
by the expenditure share for the Southern Netherlands (i.e., Belgium, Luxembourg, and
their hinterlands) according to van Zanden (1996, table 5) to derive military expendi-
tures for the (Northern) Netherlands, as data for total expenditures from Dincecco (2011)
exclude the Southern Netherlands. The source for the 1816-41 data does not provide ed-
41We thank Rui Esteves, Giovanni Federico, Klas Fregert, Michael Pammer, and Mark Spoerer for data help.
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ucation spending, which is included under the expenditure category for Home Affairs.
Military and education spending data are from van Zanden and van Riel (2010, table 2.3)
for 1850-1913. They provide data shares at 10-year intervals for 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880,
1890, 1900, and 1913. Total expenditure data from this source were used in combination
with the information on shares to back out military expenditures.
Piedmont. Military spending data are from Dincecco et al. (2011) for 1830-59, the Ufficio
Storico (1980, pp. 508-9) for 1861-9 (Italy), and Hobson (1993) for 1870-1913 (Italy). Ed-
ucation expenditures are from Felloni (1959) for 1830-59 and Brosio and Marchese (1986,
table 4a) for 1861-1913 (Italy). Population data are from Dincecco et al. (2011) for 1830-
59.
Portugal. Military and education spending data are from Silveira (1987, table 8) for
1816-27, Mata and Vale´rio (2001, table 1) for 1832-45, and Mata (1993, table 1) for 1851-
1913. To compute military expenditures, spending by the Ministerio da Guerra (after
1827; Exercito beforehand) and the Ministerio da Marihna were summed. There was
no education ministry over this period. Education expenditures thus uses the category
for the education burden (Encargos cum Instruc¸o˜es). Since the total military spending
calculation matches well with the Encargos cum Difesa category (and perfectly from 1884
onward), we are confident that the same holds for education. Dincecco (2011) does not
provide total expenditures for Portugal for 1833; this data point was taken from Mata
and Vale´rio (2001, table 1).
Prussia. The German Reich (1871-1945) was a federal system and a great deal of taxing
and spending was done at the state (e.g., Prussian) level. The federal government was
responsible for military expenditures and welfare (Ziblatt, 2006). Spoerer (2010, table 4.1)
provides Prussian military and welfare expenditures for 1847 and 1867. After unification
there are only Reich data available for these categories. These data were not used because
there was no clear way of integrating the pre-1871 Prussian series with the post-1870
Reich one. Spoerer’s data for Prussia were supplemented with 1820 data for military
defense from Ziblatt (2006, table 3.1). Here total Prussian expenditures from 1821 were
used due to data availability.
Spain. Military spending data are from Carreras and Tafunell (2006), table 12.8 for 1816-
42 and table 12.13 for 1845-1913. To compute military expenditures, spending by the
Ministerio de Guerra (through 1842; the Minsterio de Defensa from 1845 onward) and
the Ministerio de Marina were summed. The sources for the 1816-99 data do not provide
education spending, which is included under the expenditure category for the Ministerio
de Estado through 1842 and the Ministerio de Fomento from 1845 onward. Education
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spending data for the Ministerio de Fomento are displayed for 1900-13 (Ministerio de
Educacio´n y Cienca).
Sweden. Military spending data are from Krantz and Scho¨n (2010, table XI). At the central
government level, there were no separate expenditure categories for infrastructure or
education.
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Table 1: Dates of Fiscal Centralization
Year Event
England 1066 Establishment of uniform rule after Norman Conquest
France 1790 Major administrative reforms during French Revolution
Belgium 1795 Major administrative reforms after French annexation
Piedmont 1802 Major administrative reforms after French annexation
Netherlands 1806 Major administrative reforms under French control
Prussia 1806 Major administrative reforms after French defeat in battle
Spain 1845 Major administrative reforms after Moderate Coup of 1843
Austria 1848 Major administrative reforms during Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1859 Major administrative reforms after Revolutionary Era
Sweden 1861 Abolition of traditional tax system
Denmark 1903 Abolition of traditional tax system
Source: Dincecco (2011).
Note: See text for definition of fiscal centralization.
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Table 2: Dates of Limited Government
Year Event
Netherlands 1572 Establishment of Dutch Republic (1572-1795) after revolt from Spain
1848 Implementation of new constitution during Year of Revolutions
England 1688 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Glorious Revolution
Belgium 1831 Founded as constitutional monarchy after Revolution of 1830
Piedmont 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Prussia 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Denmark 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1851 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after Revolutionary Era
Sweden 1866 Introduction of bicameral legislature
Austria 1867 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after defeat by Prussia
France 1870 Formation of constitutional regime during war with Prussia
Spain 1876 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after civil war
Source: Dincecco (2011).
Note: See text for definition of limited government.
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Table 3: Political Transformations and Economic Performance, 1650-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Fiscal centralization 0.657 0.222 0.268 0.166 0.249 0.292 0.344
(0.087) (0.086) (0.125) (0.094) (0.099) (0.116) (0.171)
(0.000) (0.041) (0.033) (0.137) (0.030) (0.063) (0.063)
Limited government 0.321 0.053 -0.028 -0.102 -0.108 0.049 -0.080
(0.109) (0.165) (0.146) (0.230) (0.113) (0.225) (0.205)
(0.027) (0.757) (0.837) (0.728) (0.385) (0.836) (0.738)
Fiscal entralization * Limited government 0.232 0.311
(0.239) (0.126)
(0.433) (0.010)
Lag (1) per capita GDP growth -0.185 -0.195
(0.094) (0.094)
Lag (2) per capita GDP growth -0.168 -0.178
(0.056) (0.053)
R-squared 0.049 0.202 0.207 0.202 0.055 0.244 0.254
Observations 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,750 1,750
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country fixed effects. Columns 2-4 and 6-7 in-
clude year fixed effects and Column 5 includes a linear time trend. Additionally, Columns 3 and 7 include
country-specific time trends. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line be-
low coefficients) and p-values for two-sided Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild
bootstrap-t procedure also in parentheses (second line below coefficients for Fiscal Centralization, Limited
Government, and interaction term).
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Table 4: Political Transformations and Economic Performance, 1650-1913: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Fiscal centralization 0.206 0.246 0.316 0.337 0.216 0.429 0.220 0.272 0.377
(0.096) (0.132) (0.101) (0.170) (0.170) (0.097) (0.073) (0.080) (0.130)
(0.064) (0.086) (0.015) (0.084) (0.238) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Limited government 0.080 -0.002 0.020 -0.068 0.045 0.138 -0.055 -0.043 -0.159
(0.175) (0.142) (0.035) (0.198) (0.231) (0.152) (0.191) (0.172) (0.374)
(0.644) (0.983) (0.467) (0.760) (0.845) (0.360) (0.758) (0.807) (0.673)
External conflict dummy (lagged) 0.264 0.271 0.072 0.189 0.160 -0.003 -0.066 -0.218 0.310
(0.279) (0.279) (0.054) (0.214) (0.226) (0.106) (0.084) (0.114) (0.450)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 0.030 0.101 -0.429 -0.038 -0.117 0.144 -0.252 -0.320 -0.534
(0.239) (0.250) (0.120) (0.249) (0.207) (0.169) (0.425) (0.186) (0.411)
Population growth (lagged) 0.008 0.009 -0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.029 -0.017
(0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.028) (0.095)
Lag (1) per capita GDP growth -0.193 -0.185 -0.177
(0.093) (0.092) (0.096)
Lag (2) per capita GDP growth -0.177 -0.170 -0.139
(0.054) (0.058) (0.053)
Lag (3) log per capita GDP -0.612 0.223
(0.832) (0.420)
R-squared 0.205 0.211 0.208 0.256 0.247 0.096 0.425 0.626 0.720
Observations 1,757 1,757 1,027 1,746 1,746 1,746 350 173 65
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed effects
except for Column 6, which includes a linear time trend. Additionally, Columns 2-4 include country-specific time trends.
Column 3 restricts the data to before 1845 and Columns 7-9 use 5-, 10-, and 25-year data averages, respectively. Cluster-
robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values for two-sided Wald
tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in parentheses (second line below
coefficients for Fiscal Centralization and Limited Government).
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Table 5: Political Transformations and Extractive Capacity, 1650-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable is Per Capita Revenue Growth
Fiscal centralization 1.405 1.467 2.929 3.254 6.610 3.770 3.923 4.268
(0.497) (0.531) (0.926) (0.738) (2.526) (1.251) (0.907) (1.081)
(0.001) (0.007) (0.039) (0.025) (0.108) (0.028) (0.006) (0.035)
Limited government 0.438 0.047 0.717 1.215 1.883 1.209 1.601 5.117
(0.564) (0.638) (0.652) (0.631) (0.758) (0.989) (0.807) (2.791)
(0.466) (0.973) (0.348) (0.120) (0.017) (0.254) (0.080) (0.236)
External conflict dummy (lagged) -0.774 -0.777 -1.257 0.620 0.957 -0.540 1.526
(1.237) (1.115) (0.508) (1.180) (1.887) (0.692) (1.796)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 2.697 3.008 1.854 4.190 2.106 1.262 0.499
(0.858) (0.962) (1.587) (1.518) (1.131) (1.823) (2.495)
Population growth (lagged) -0.191 -0.192 -0.064 -0.226 -0.274 -0.134 -0.256
(0.110) (0.110) (0.090) (0.056) (0.171) (0.149) (0.162)
Lag (1) per capita revenue growth -0.173 -0.169 -0.227
(0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
Lag (2) per capita revenue growth -0.132 -0.128 -0.201
(0.049) (0.044) (0.057)
Lag (3) log per capita revenues -11.401
(2.405)
R-squared 0.160 0.162 0.165 0.008 0.176 0.197 0.045 0.235
Observations 1,760 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,019 1,734 1,734 1,734
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country fixed effects. All specifications include year
fixed effects except for Columns 4 and 7, which include linear time trends. Additionally, Columns 3-8 include
country-specific time trends. The sample period is 1650-1845 for Column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors clus-
tered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values for two-sided Wald tests computed
according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in parentheses (second line below coefficients
for Fiscal Centralization and Limited Government).
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Table 6: Alternative State Capacity Measures, 1816-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable is State Capacity Growth Measure
Non-Mil Non-Mil Mil Edu Edu RR RR
Exps Exps Exps Exps Exps Miles Miles
Fiscal centralization -4.606 -0.429 0.046 -0.006 -0.117 1.224 2.718
(3.405) (3.715) (0.029) (0.068) (0.116) (1.393) (0.920)
(0.417) (0.927) (0.180) (0.877) (0.384) (0.357) (0.128)
Limited government 1.194 7.069 -0.066 0.081 0.138 2.480 4.927
(5.418) (2.933) (0.042) (0.016) (0.011) (4.512) (4.255)
(0.866) (0.139) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.556) (0.531)
External conflict dummy (lagged) -1.070 2.860 -0.149 -0.062 -0.007 -5.338 -0.604
(3.084) (3.748) (0.064) (0.030) (0.045) (3.746) (1.730)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 3.800 0.036 0.030 -0.040 -0.045 1.784 3.069
(1.893) (2.225) (0.075) (0.070) (0.070) (5.488) (4.778)
Population growth (lagged) 0.423 -0.050 -0.259 -1.074 0.578 -3.221 0.221
(0.264) (0.061) (0.261) (4.731) (5.780) (3.885) (1.081)
Lag (1) dependent variable log level -54.445
(33.094)
Lag (1) dependent variable -0.496 -0.370 -0.202
(0.054) (0.103) (0.060)
Lag (2) dependent variable -0.294 -0.061 -0.134
(0.044) (0.051) (0.033)
Lag (3) dependent variable log level -32.955 -28.164
(3.745) (5.003)
R-squared 0.186 0.348 0.200 0.463 0.515 0.495 0.517
Observations 724 694 728 330 320 435 413
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All fiscal variables are in per capita terms. All specifications include country
and year fixed effects and country-specific time trends. The sample period is 1870-1913 for Columns 6 and 7.
Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values
for two-sided Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in
parentheses (second line below coefficients for Fiscal Centralization and Limited Government).
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Table 7: State Capacity and Economic Performance, 1650-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Lag (1) per capita revenue growth -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag (2) per capita revenue growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag (3) log per capita revenues 0.112 0.117 0.154 0.184 0.159
(0.031) (0.033) (0.064) (0.089) (0.073)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.023)
Lag (1) per capita non-mil exp growth -0.007
(0.005)
Lag (2) log per capita non-mil exp growth 0.000
(0.008)
Lag (3) log per capita non-mil exps -0.032
(0.380)
(0.880)
Fiscal centralization 0.260
(0.130)
(0.059)
Limited government -0.043
(0.131)
(0.718)
External conflict dummy (lagged) -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.025
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 0.295 0.296 0.216 0.287 0.897
(0.300) (0.298) (0.247) (0.285) (0.880)
Population growth (lagged) 0.037 0.124 0.000 0.111 0.853
(0.263) (0.285) (0.266) (0.267) (0.284)
Lag (1) per capita GDP growth -0.193
(0.092)
Lag (2) per capita GDP growth -0.175
(0.054)
R-squared 0.204 0.205 0.210 0.255 0.211 0.206
Observations 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 699
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. Addition-
ally, Columns 3-6 include country-specific time trends. The sample period is 1816-1913 for Column
6. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and
p-values for two-sided Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t
procedure also in parentheses (second line below coefficients for Lag (3) Log Per Capita Revenues,
Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Lag (3) Log Per Capita Non-Military Expenditures).
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Table 8: Placebo Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
25 yrs prior 50 yrs prior 75 yrs prior 100 yrs prior
Static Model
Fiscal centralization (placebo) 0.007 -0.158 -0.079 -0.037
(0.132) (0.106) (0.074) (0.092)
Limited government (placebo) -0.048 -0.037 -0.035 -0.045
(0.173) (0.107) (0.086) (0.075)
Observations 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757
Dynamic Model
Fiscal centralization (placebo) 0.012 -0.188 -0.099 -0.047
(0.163) (0.135) (0.096) (0.127)
Limited government (placebo) -0.018 -0.056 -0.043 -0.071
(0.237) (0.126) (0.103) (0.090)
Observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Revenue Growth
25 yrs prior 50 yrs prior 75 yrs prior 100 yrs prior
Static Model
Fiscal centralization (placebo) -0.232 -0.727 -0.340 -1.868
(0.879) (0.950) (0.812) (0.938)
Limited government (placebo) 0.164 -0.536 -1.034 -0.598
(0.619) (0.937) (1.489) (1.357)
Observations 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748
Dynamic Model
Fiscal centralization (placebo) 0.070 -1.025 -0.569 -2.207
(0.720) (1.172) -1.096 (1.367)
Limited government (placebo) 0.671 -0.689 -0.917 -0.471
(1.138) (1.177) (1.819) (2.011)
Observations 1,734 1,734 1,734 1,734
Panel C: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Non-Military Expenditure Growth
25 yrs prior 30 yrs prior 35 yrs prior 40 yrs prior
Static Model
Fiscal centralization (placebo) 1.018 0.684 3.709 8.720
(2.086) (2.502) (5.273) (12.342)
Limited government (placebo) -2.378 -4.855 -5.861 -3.916
(4.203) (6.402) (8.632) (10.660)
Observations 724 724 724 724
Dynamic Model
Fiscal centralization (placebo) -2.025 -1.696 -3.142 -5.846
(2.871) (2.892) (5.214) (21.222)
Limited government (placebo) -0.922 -4.036 -4.369 2.116
(3.376) (5.904) (7.541) (6.964)
Observations 694 694 694 694
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country and year fixed effects
and time-varying controls. The sample period is 1650-1913 for Panels A and B and 1816-
1913 for Panel C. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Time-demeaned average annual real per capita GDP growth around political transformations. Top
panel shows 50 years before and after and bottom panel shows 10 years before and after. Left panel shows
fiscal centralization and right panel shows limited government. Circles represent average per capita GDP
growth rates across sample countries. Solid lines represent locally-weighted regression curves fitted to data.
Dashed horizontal lines are pre-transformation and post-transformation average per capita GDP growth rates.
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Figure 2: Time-varying relationships between fiscal centralization (left panel) or limited government (right
panel) and average annual real per capita GDP growth. Solid circles correspond to point estimates for coeffi-
cients of pulse dummies and solid lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals (Equation 2). C˜1i,t, L˜
1
i,t = 1 for
years 6 to 10 before political transformations; C˜2i,t, L˜
2
i,t = 1 for years 1 to 5 before; C˜
3
i,t, L˜
3
i,t = 1 for years 0 to 4
after (including transformation year itself); C˜4i,t, L˜
4
i,t = 1 for years 5 to 9 after; and C˜
5
i,t, L˜
5
i,t = 1 from 10th year
post-transformation onward.
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Figure 3: Tests of conditional correlations between annual real per capita GDP growth and “future” political
transformations. Blue dot represents point estimate for α1,0, the coefficient for Ci,t in Equation 4. Circles are
point estimates for α1,τ , τ = 1, . . . , q. Solid lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.
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